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Abstract
We construct a quantum oracle relative to which BQP = QMA but cryptographic pseudorandom
quantum states and pseudorandom unitary transformations exist, a counterintuitive result in light
of the fact that pseudorandom states can be “broken” by quantum Merlin-Arthur adversaries. We
explain how this nuance arises as the result of a distinction between algorithms that operate on
quantum and classical inputs. On the other hand, we show that some computational complexity
assumption is needed to construct pseudorandom states, by proving that pseudorandom states do
not exist if BQP = PP. We discuss implications of these results for cryptography, complexity theory,
and quantum tomography.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Quantum complexity theory
Keywords and phrases pseudorandom quantum states, quantum Merlin-Arthur
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2021.2
Related Version Previous Version: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.09320
Funding William Kretschmer : Supported by a National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate
(NDSEG) Fellowship from the US Department of Defense.
Acknowledgements Thanks to Scott Aaronson for suggestions on the writing, Adam Bouland for
insightful discussions, and Qipeng Liu for clarifying some questions about [16].
1 Introduction
Pseudorandomness is a key concept in complexity theory and cryptography, capturing the
notion of objects that appear random to computationally-bounded adversaries. Recent works
have extended the theory of computational pseudorandomness to quantum objects, with
a particular focus on quantum states and unitary transformations that resemble the Haar
measure [19, 13, 12].
Ji, Liu, and Song [19] define a pseudorandom state (PRS) ensemble as a keyed family
of quantum states {|φk⟩}k∈K such that states from the ensemble can be generated in
polynomial time, and such that no polynomial-time quantum adversary can distinguish
polynomially many copies of a random |φk⟩ from polynomially many copies of a Haar-
random state. They also define an ensemble of pseudorandom unitary transformations
(PRUs) analogously as a set of efficiently implementable unitary transformations that are
computationally indistinguishable from the Haar measure. These definitions can be viewed
as quantum analogues of pseudorandom generators (PRGs) and pseudorandom functions
(PRFs), respectively. The authors then present a construction of PRSs assuming the existence
of quantum-secure one-way functions, and also give a candidate construction of PRUs that
they conjecture is secure.
Several applications of PRSs and PRUs are known. PRSs and PRUs are potentially
useful in quantum algorithms: in computational applications that require approximations
to the Haar measure, PRSs and PRUs can be much more efficient than t-designs, which
are information-theoretic approximations to the Haar measure that are analogous to t-
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wise independent functions.1 Cryptographic applications are possible, with [19] giving a
construction of a private-key quantum money scheme based on PRSs. Recent work by
Bouland, Fefferman, and Vazirani [12] has also established a fundamental connection between
PRSs and any possible resolution to the so-called “wormhole growth paradox” in the AdS/CFT
correspondence.
1.1 Main Results
Given the importance of PRSs and PRUs across quantum complexity theory, in this work
we seek to better understand the theoretical basis for the existence of these primitives. We
start with a very basic question: what hardness assumptions are necessary for the existence
of PRSs,2 and which unlikely complexity collapses (such as P = PSPACE or BQP = QMA)
would invalidate the security of PRSs? Viewed another way, we ask: what computational
power suffices to distinguish PRSs from Haar-random states?
At first glance, it appears that an “obvious” upper bound on the power needed to
break PRSs is QMA, the quantum analogue of NP consisting of problems decidable by a
polynomial-time quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol (or even QCMA, where the witness is
restricted to be classical). If Arthur holds many copies of a pure quantum state |ψ⟩ that
can be prepared by some polynomial-size quantum circuit C, then Merlin can send Arthur
a classical description of C, and Arthur can verify via the swap test that the output of C
approximates |ψ⟩. By contrast, most Haar-random states cannot even be approximated by
small quantum circuits. So, in some sense, PRSs can be “distinguished” from Haar-random
by quantum Merlin-Arthur adversaries.
There is a subtle problem here, though: QMA is defined as a set of decision problems
where the inputs are classical bit strings, whereas an adversary against a PRS ensemble
inherently operates on a quantum input. As a result, it is unclear whether the hardness of
breaking PRSs can be related to the hardness of QMA, or any other standard complexity
class. Even if we had a proof that BQP = QMA, this might not give rise to an efficient
algorithm for breaking the security of PRSs.
One way to tackle this is to consider quantum adversaries that can query a classical oracle.
If we can show that PRSs can be broken by a polynomial-time quantum algorithm with
oracle access to some language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗, we conclude that if PRSs exist, then L ̸∈ BQP.
A priori, it is not immediately obvious whether oracle access to any language L suffices for
a polynomial-time quantum adversary to break PRSs. For our first result, we show that a
PP-complete language works. Hence, if BQP = PP, then PRSs do not exist.
▶ Theorem 1 (Informal version of Theorem 15). There exists a polynomial-time quantum
algorithm augmented with a PP oracle that can distinguish PRSs from Haar-random states.
This raises the natural question of whether the PP oracle in the above theorem can be
made weaker. For instance, can we break PRSs with a QCMA or QMA oracle, coinciding
with our intuition that the task is solvable by a quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol? In our
second result, we show that this intuition is perhaps misguided, as we construct a quantum
oracle relative to which such a QMA reduction is impossible.
1 t-designs are also sometimes called “pseudorandom” in the literature, e.g. [27, 14]. We emphasize that
t-designs and PRSs/PRUs are fundamentally different notions and that they are generally incomparable:
a t-design need not be a PRS/PRU ensemble, or vice-versa.
2 Note that PRUs imply PRSs, so we focus only on PRSs for this part.
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▶ Theorem 2 (Informal version of Theorem 18 and Theorem 21). There exists a quantum
oracle O such that:
(1) BQPO = QMAO, and
(2) PRUs (and hence PRSs) exist relative to O.
Let us remark how bizarre this theorem appears from a cryptographer’s point of view.
If BQP = QMA, then no quantum-secure classical cryptographic primitives exist, because
such primitives can be broken in NP. So, our construction is a black-box separation between
PRUs and all quantum-secure classical cryptography – a relativized world in which any
computationally-secure cryptography must use quantum communication. Theorem 2 thus
provides a negative answer (in the quantum black box setting) to a question of Ji, Liu, and
Song [19] that asks if quantum-secure one-way functions are necessary for PRSs. One could
even view our result as evidence that it might be possible to base the existence of PRSs and
PRUs on weaker assumptions than those usually used for classical cryptography.
1.2 Application: Hyperefficient Shadow Tomography
An immediate corollary of our results is a new impossibility result for shadow tomography.
Aaronson [2] defined the shadow tomography problem as the following estimation task: given
copies of an n-qubit mixed state ρ and a list of two-outcome measurements O1, . . . , OM ,
estimate Tr(Oiρ) for each i up to additive error ε. Aaronson showed that, remarkably,
this is possible using very few copies of ρ: just poly(n, logM, 1ε ) copies suffice, which is
polylogarithmic in both the dimension of ρ and the number of quantities to be estimated.
Aaronson then asked in what cases shadow tomography can be made computationally
efficient with respect to n and logM . Of course, just writing down the input to the problem
would take Ω(4nM) time if the measurements are given explicitly as Hermitian matrices, and
listing the outputs would also take Ω(M) time. But perhaps one could hope for an algorithm
that only operates implicitly on both the inputs and outputs. For example, suppose we
stipulate the existence of a quantum algorithm that performs the measurement Oi given
input i ∈ [M ], and that this algorithm runs in time poly(n, logM). Consider a shadow
tomography procedure that takes a description of such an algorithm as input, and that
outputs a quantum circuit C such that |C(i) − Tr(Oiρ)| ≤ ε for each i ∈ [M ].3 Aaronson
calls this a “hyperefficient” shadow tomography protocol if it additionally runs in time
poly(n, logM, 1ε ).
Aaronson gave some evidence that hyperefficient shadow tomography is unlikely to
exist, by observing that if hyperefficient shadow tomography is possible, then quantum
advice can always be efficiently replaced by classical advice – in other words, BQP/qpoly =
BQP/poly. However, Aaronson and Kuperberg [4] showed a quantum oracle U relative to
which BQPU/qpoly ̸= BQPU/poly, which implies that hyperefficient shadow tomography is
impossible if the observables are merely given as a black box that implements the measurement.
The proof of this oracle separation amounts to showing that if the oracle U either (1)
implements a reflection about a Haar-random n-qubit state, or (2) acts as the identity, then
no poly(n)-query algorithm can distinguish these two cases, even given a classical witness of
size poly(n).
3 Note the slight abuse of notation here, as the shadow tomography procedure can err with some small
probability, and C itself might be a probabilistic quantum circuit. For simplicity, we assume that the
shadow tomography procedure always succeeds and that C is deterministic in this exposition.
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One can consider stronger forms of query access to the observables. For instance, in
the common scenario where each observable measures fidelity with a pure state, meaning
it has the form Oi = |ψi⟩ ⟨ψi|, then in addition to the ability to measure overlap with |ψi⟩,
one might also have the power to produce copies of |ψi⟩. Note that the ability to prepare
|ψi⟩ is generally much more powerful than the ability to recognize |ψi⟩, the latter of which
is equivalent to oracle access to the reflection 1 − 2 |ψi⟩ ⟨ψi|. For example, Aaronson and
Kuperberg’s oracle separation of QCMA and QMA [4] amounts to building an oracle relative
to which certain quantum states can be recognized efficiently but cannot be approximately
prepared by small quantum circuits. Other black-box separations of state preparation and
state reflection are known, e.g. [9], so one might hope that this type of query access could be
substantially more powerful for shadow tomography as well.
Nevertheless, our results imply that black-box hyperefficient shadow tomography is
impossible even in this setting where we have state preparation access to the observables.
This follows from the simple observation that hyperefficient shadow tomography of this form
would suffice to break PRS ensembles with a QCMA oracle.
▶ Theorem 3. If a hyperefficient shadow tomography procedure exists that works for any
list of observables of the form |ψ1⟩ ⟨ψ1| , . . . , |ψM ⟩ ⟨ψM | given state preparation access to
|ψ1⟩ , . . . , |ψM ⟩, then all PRS ensembles can be broken by polynomial-time quantum adversaries
with oracle access to QCMA.
Proof sketch. For a given PRS ensemble {|φk⟩}k∈K, we have state preparation access to
the observable list {|φk⟩ ⟨φk|}k∈K by way of the generating algorithm of the PRS. Hence,
we can run hyperefficient shadow tomography using this observable list on copies of some
unknown state |ψ⟩. Suppose that this produces a quantum circuit C such that |C(k) −
Tr(|φk⟩ ⟨φk|ψ⟩ ⟨ψ|)| ≤ 110 for each k ∈ K. Observe that the problem of deciding whether
there exists some k such that C(k) ≥ 910 is in QCMA. If |ψ⟩ is pseudorandom, then such a
k always exists (whichever k satisfies |ψ⟩ = |φk⟩), whereas if |ψ⟩ is Haar-random, such a k
exists with negligible probability over the choice of |ψ⟩. Hence, these two ensembles can be
distinguished by feeding C into this QCMA language. ◀
The above theorem also relativizes, in the sense that if the shadow tomography procedure
only accesses the state preparation algorithm via a black box O, then hyperefficient shadow
tomography lets us break PRSs in polynomial time with oracle access to O and QCMAO.
Since Theorem 2 gives an oracle relative to which BQPO = QCMAO = QMAO and PRSs
exist, we conclude that hyperefficient shadow tomography is impossible with only black-box
state preparation access to the observables.
1.3 Our Techniques
The starting point for the proof of Theorem 1, which gives an upper bound of PP on the
power needed to break pseudorandom states, is a theorem of Huang, Kueng, and Preskill
[17] that gives a simple procedure for shadow tomography.
▶ Theorem 4 ([17]). Fix M different observables O1, O2, . . . , OM and an unknown n-qubit
mixed state ρ. Then there exists a quantum algorithm that performs T = O(log(M/δ)/ε2 ·
maxi Tr(O2i )) single-copy measurements in random Clifford bases of ρ, and uses the meas-
urement results to estimate the quantities Tr(O1ρ),Tr(O2ρ), . . . ,Tr(OMρ), such that with
probability at least 1− δ, all of the M quantities are correct up to additive error ε.
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If {|φk⟩k∈K} is a family of PRSs, then by choosing Ok = |φk⟩ ⟨φk| for each k ∈ K to
be the list of observables, we can use the above algorithm to determine whether ρ is close
to one of the states in the PRS ensemble. A Haar-random state will be far from all of
the pseudorandom states with overwhelming probability. Hence, Theorem 4 implies the
existence of an algorithm that distinguishes the pseudorandom and Haar-random ensembles,
by performing a polynomial number of random Clifford measurements and analyzing the
results. The key observation is that the Clifford measurements can be performed efficiently,
even though the resulting analysis (which operates on purely classical information) might be
computationally expensive.
Next, one could try to argue that the computationally difficult steps in the above algorithm
can be made efficient with a PP oracle. However, we take a different approach. We adopt
a Bayesian perspective: suppose that with 50% probability we are given copies of a Haar-
random state, and otherwise with 50% probability we are given copies of a randomly chosen
state from the pseudorandom ensemble. We wish to distinguish these two cases using only
the results of the random Clifford measurements as observed data. One way to do this is
via the Bayes decision rule: we compute the posterior probability of being Haar-random or
pseudorandom given the measurements, and then guess the more likely result. In fact, the
Bayes decision rule is well-known to be the optimal decision rule in general, in the sense that
any decision rule errs at least as often as the Bayes decision rule (see e.g. [11, Chapter 4.4.1]).
Hence, because the algorithm of Huang, Kueng, and Preskill (Theorem 4) distinguishes the
Haar-random and pseudorandom ensembles with good probability, the Bayes decision rule
conditioned on the random Clifford measurements must work at least as well at the same
distinguishing task.
Finally, we observe that using a quantum algorithm with postselection, we can approximate
the relevant posterior probabilities needed for the Bayes decision rule. This allows us to
appeal to the equivalence PostBQP = PP [1] to simulate this postselection with a PP oracle.
Technically, one challenge is that the postselected quantum algorithm requires the ability
to prepare copies of a Haar-random state, even though a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
cannot even approximately prepare most Haar-random states. The solution is to replace the
Haar ensemble by an approximate quantum design, which we argue does not substantially
change the success probability of the algorithm.
For our second result (Theorem 2), the oracle construction we use is simple to describe.
The oracle O consists of two parts: a quantum oracle U = {Un}n∈N, where each Un consists
of 2n different Haar-random n-qubit unitary matrices, and a classical oracle P that is an
arbitrary PSPACE-complete language. We prove that Theorem 2 holds with probability 1
over the choice of U .
Showing that PRUs exist relative to (U ,P) is reasonably straightforward. The proof uses
the BBBV theorem (i.e. the optimality of Grover’s algorithm) [10], and is analogous to showing
that one-way functions or pseudorandom generators exist relative to a random classical oracle,
as was shown by Impagliazzo and Rudich [18]. We only rigorously prove security against
adversaries with classical advice, though we believe that the recently introduced framework
of Chung, Guo, Liu, and Qian [16] should yield a security proof against adversaries with
quantum advice.
Slightly more technically involved is proving that BQPU,P = QMAU,P . To do so, we
argue that a QMA verifier is not substantially more powerful than a BQP machine at learning
nontrivial properties of U . More precisely, we argue that if a QMA verifier V makes T queries
to Un for some n ∈ N, then either (1) n = O(log T ) is sufficiently small that poly(T ) queries
to Un actually suffice to learn Un to inverse-polynomial precision, or else (2) n = ω(log t) is
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sufficiently large that with high probability, the maximum acceptance probability of V (over
the choice of Merlin’s witness) is close to the average maximum acceptance probability of V
when Un is replaced by a random set of matrices sampled from the Haar measure. We prove
this as a consequence of the extremely strong concentration of measure properties exhibited
by the Haar measure [22].
This allows a BQPU,P machine to approximate the maximum acceptance probability of
VU,P as follows. In case (1), the BQPU,P machine first queries Un enough times to learn a
unitary transformation Ũn that is close to Un, and then hard codes Ũn into a new QMAP
verifier Ṽ that simulates V by replacing queries to Un with calls to Ũn. In case (2), the BQPU,P
machine similarly constructs a new QMAP verifier Ṽ, instead simulating V by replacing
queries to Un with unitaries chosen from an approximate polynomial design.4 In both cases,
Ṽ defines a QMAP problem. Because P is PSPACE-complete, BQPP = QMAP = PSPACE,
and therefore this problem can be decided with a single query to P.
The astute reader may notice that this proof works for more general choices of P: it
shows that for any oracle P , if BQPP = QMAP , then BQPU,P = QMAU,P with probability 1
over the choice of U . An interesting consequence is the special case when P is trivial.
▶ Corollary 5. If BQP = QMA, then BQPU = QMAU with probability 1 over the choice of U .
In words, if BQP = QMA in the unrelativized world, then the complexity classes also
coincide relative to a collection U of Haar-random oracles. Or, viewed another way, separating
BQP from QMA relative to U requires separating them in the unrelativized world. This is in
stark contrast to the case of random classical oracles, where we can prove unconditionally
that for a uniformly random oracle O, BQPO ̸= QMAO (and indeed, NPO ̸⊂ BQPO) with
probability 1 over O [10].
1.4 Open Problems
Can we prove a similar result to Theorem 2 using a classical oracle, for either PRUs or PRSs?
Attempting to resolve this question seems to run into many of the same difficulties that arise
in constructing a classical oracle separation between QCMA and QMA, which also remains
an open problem [4]. For one, as pointed out in [4], we do not even know whether every
n-qubit unitary transformation can be approximately implemented in poly(n) time relative
to some classical oracle. Even if one could resolve this, it is not clear whether the resulting
PRUs or PRSs would be secure against adversaries with the power of QMA. For instance,
we show in Appendix C that an existing construction of PRSs, whose security is provable in
the random oracle model [13], can be broken with an NP oracle.
What else can be said about the hardness of learning quantum states and unitary
transformations, either in the worst case or on average? A related question is to explore the
hardness of problems involving quantum meta-complexity: that is, problems that themselves
encode computational complexity or difficulty. Consider, for example, a version of the
minimum circuit size problem (MCSP) for quantum states: given copies of a pure quantum
state |ψ⟩, determine the size of the smallest quantum circuit that approximately outputs |ψ⟩.
If PRSs exist, then this task should be hard, but placing an upper bound on the complexity
of this task might be difficult in light of our results. We view this problem as particularly
intriguing because it does not appear to have an obvious classical analogue, and also because of
4 Technically, this requires choosing a random element of the polynomial design for each x ∈ {0, 1}n by
means of a random oracle, so we use Zhandry’s strategy [28] to simulate T quantum queries to a random
oracle using a 2T -wise independent function.
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its relevance to the wormhole growth paradox and Susskind’s Complexity=Volume conjecture
in AdS/CFT [12, 25, 24]. A number of recent breakthroughs in complexity theory have
involved ideas from meta-complexity (see surveys by Allender [6, 7]), and it would be
interesting to see which of these techniques could be ported to the quantum setting.
What other complexity-theoretic evidence can be given for the existence of PRSs and
PRUs? Can we give candidate constructions of PRSs or PRUs that do not rely on the
assumption BQP ̸= QMA? To give a specific example, an interesting question is whether
polynomial-size quantum circuits with random local gates form PRUs. Random circuits are
known to information-theoretically approximate the Haar measure in the sense that they




Throughout, [n] denotes the set of integers {1, 2, . . . , n}, and [n,m] denotes the set of integers
{n, n + 1, n + 2, . . . ,m}. If x ∈ {0, 1}n is a binary string, then |x| denotes the length of
x. For X a finite set, we let |X| denote the size of X. If X is a probability distribution,
then we use x← X to denote a random variable x sampled according to X. When X is a
finite set, we also use x← X to indicate a random variable x drawn uniformly from X. A
function f(n) is negligible if for every constant c > 0, f(n) ≤ 1nc for all sufficiently large n.
We use negl(n) to denote an arbitrary negligible function, and poly(n) to denote an arbitrary
polynomially-bounded function.
We use ||M ||F =
√
Tr (M†M) to denote the Frobenius norm of a matrix M . We denote
by ||A||⋄ the diamond norm of a superoperator A acting on density matrices (see [5] for a
definition). For a unitary matrix U , we use U · U† to denote the superoperator that maps a
density matrix ρ to UρU†.
We use S(N) to denote the set of N -dimensional pure quantum states, and U(N) to
denote the group of N ×N unitary matrices. When N = 2n, we identify these with n-qubit
states and unitary transformations, respectively. We use σN to denote the Haar measure on
S(N), and we let µN denote the Haar measure over U(N). We write U(N)M for the space
of MN ×MN block-diagonal unitary matrices, where each block has size N ×N , and we
also identify U(N)M with M -tuples of N ×N unitary matrices. We use µMN to denote the
product measure µMN (U1, U2, . . . , UM ) = µN (U1) · µN (U2) · · ·µN (UM ) on U(N)M .
We assume familiarity with standard complexity classes such as BQP and PP, including
relativized versions of these classes that can query a quantum or classical oracle. For
completeness, we define some of the relevant complexity classes and related notions in
Appendix B.
We use superscript notation for algorithms that query oracles. For instance, AU (x, |ψ⟩)
denotes a quantum algorithm A that queries an oracle U and receives a classical input x and
a quantum input |ψ⟩.
2.2 Quantum Information
We require the following well-known fact, which bounds the distance in the diamond norm
between two unitary superoperators in terms of the Frobenius norm of the difference of the
two matrices. We provide a proof in Appendix A.
▶ Lemma 6. Let U, V ∈ U(N). Then ||U · U† − V · V †||⋄ ≤ 2||U − V ||F .
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We use the notion of an ε-approximate quantum (state) t-design, which is a distribution
over quantum states that information-theoretically approximates the Haar measure over
states.
▶ Definition 7 (Approximate quantum design [8]). A probability distribution S over S(N) is
an ε-approximate quantum t-design if:
(1− ε) E
|ψ⟩←σN
|ψ⟩ ⟨ψ|⊗t ≤ E
|ψ⟩←S






|ψ⟩ ⟨ψ| = E
|ψ⟩←σN
|ψ⟩ ⟨ψ| .
Similarly, we require ε-approximate unitary t-designs, which are approximations to the
Haar measure over unitary matrices. The definition of ε-approximate unitary t-designs is
more technical, so we point to [15, Definition 2] for a formal definition. While there are
several definitions of approximate t-designs used in the literature, for this work it is crucial
that we use multiplicative approximate designs for both states and unitaries, meaning that
the designs approximate the first t moments of the Haar measure to within a multiplicative
1± ε error (as opposed to additive error).
Efficient constructions of approximate unitary t-designs over qubits are known, as below.
▶ Lemma 8. Fix ε > 0. For each n, t ∈ N, there exists m(n) ≤ poly(n) and a poly(n, t)-
time classical algorithm S that takes as input a random string x← {0, 1}m and outputs a
description of a quantum circuit on n qubits such that the circuits sampled from S form an
ε-approximate unitary t-design over U(2n).
Proof sketch. Fix an arbitrary universal quantum gate set G with algebraic entries that is
closed under taking inverses (e.g. G = {CNOT, H, T, T †}). Brandão, Harrow, and Horodecki
[15, Corollary 7] show that n-qubit quantum circuits consisting of poly(n, t) random gates
sampled from G, applied to random pairs of qubits, form ε-approximate unitary t-designs.
So, S just has to sample from this distribution, which can be done with poly(n, t) bits of
randomness. ◀
Note that this also implies an efficient construction of ε-approximate quantum (state) t-
designs, as if S is an ε-approximate unitary t-design over U(N) then S |ψ⟩ is an ε-approximate
quantum t-design for any fixed |ψ⟩ (e.g. |0n⟩).
Essentially the only property we need of approximate t-designs is that they can be used
in place of the Haar measure in any quantum algorithm that uses t copies of a Haar-random
state (or t queries to a Haar-random unitary), and the measurement probabilities of the
algorithm will change by only a small multiplicative factor.






























▶ Fact 10 ([15]). Let S be an ε-approximate unitary t-design over U(N), and let AU be an











≤ (1 + ε) Pr
U←µN
[A = 1] .
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We require the following concentration inequality on the Haar measure, which is stated
in terms of Lipschitz continuous functions. For a metric space M with metric d, a function
f : M → R is L-Lipschitz if for all x, y ∈M , |f(x)− f(y)| ≤ L · d(x, y).
▶ Theorem 11 ([22, Theorem 5.17]). Given N1, . . . , Nk ∈ N, let X = U(N1)⊕ · · · ⊕ U(Nk)
be the space of block-diagonal unitary matrices with blocks of size N1, . . . , Nk. Let µ =
µN1 × · · · × µNk be the product of Haar measures on X. Suppose that f : X → R is















where N = min{N1, . . . , Nk}.
2.3 Cryptography
A family of functions {fk}k∈K where fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is called t-wise independent if




[fk(xi) = yi ∀i ∈ [t]] = 2−mt.
Efficient constructions of t-wise independent functions are known, in the sense that one can
sample a random fk from a t-wise independent function family and make queries to fk in
poly(t, n,m) time [28]. Our primary use of t-wise independent functions is in simulating
random oracles: 2t-wise independent functions can be used in place of a uniformly random
function {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m in any quantum algorithm that makes at most t queries to the
random function; see Zhandry [28, Theorem 6.1] for more details.
We use the following definitions of pseudorandom quantum states (PRSs) and pseudoran-
dom unitaries (PRUs), which were introduced by Ji, Liu, and Song [19].
▶ Definition 12 (Pseudorandom quantum states [19]). Let κ ∈ N be the security parameter.
Let D be the dimension of a quantum system and let K be the key set, both parameterized by
κ. A keyed family of quantum states {|φk⟩}k∈K ⊂ S(D) is pseudorandom if the following
two conditions hold:
(1) (Efficient generation) There is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm G that generates
|φk⟩ on input k, meaning G(k) = |φk⟩.
(2) (Computationally indistinguishable) For any polynomial-time quantum algorithm A and








▶ Definition 13 (Pseudorandom unitary transformations [19]). Let κ ∈ N be the security
parameter. Let D be the dimension of a quantum system and let K be the key set, both para-
meterized by κ. A keyed family of unitary transformations {Uk}k∈K ⊂ U(D) is pseudorandom
if the following two conditions hold:
(1) (Efficient computation) There is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm G that implements
Uk on input k, meaning that for any |ψ⟩ ∈ S(D), G(k, |ψ⟩) = Uk |ψ⟩.
(2) (Computationally indistinguishable) For any polynomial-time quantum algorithm AU
that queries U ∈ U(D):∣∣∣∣ Prk←K [AUk (1κ) = 1]− PrU←µD [AU (1κ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ).
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We generally take the key set K = {0, 1}κ and choose D = 2n for some n = poly(κ) in
the above definitions. We sometimes call the negligible quantities in the above definitions
the advantage of the quantum adversary A.
In this work, we consider security against non-uniform quantum algorithms with classical
advice, which means that the adversary is allowed to be a different polynomial-time quantum
algorithm for each setting of the security parameter κ ∈ N. Without loss of generality, such
an adversary can always be assumed to take the form of a uniform poly(κ)-time quantum
algorithm A (1κ, x), where x ∈ {0, 1}poly(κ) is an advice string that depends only on κ.
3 Breaking Pseudorandomness with a Classical Oracle
In this section, we prove that a polynomial-time quantum algorithm with a PP oracle can
distinguish a PRS from a Haar-random state. First, we need a lemma about the overlap
between a fixed state |φ⟩ and a Haar-random state |ψ⟩.




| ⟨ψ|φ⟩ |2 ≥ ε
]
≤ e−εN .
Proof. This follows from standard concentration inequalities, or even an explicit computation,
using the fact that | ⟨ψ|φ⟩ |2 is roughly exponentially distributed for a random state |ψ⟩. See
e.g. [15, Equation (14)] ◀
The formal statement of our result is below.
▶ Theorem 15. For any PRS ensemble {|φk⟩}k∈K of n-qubit states with security parameter
κ, there exists a PP language L, a poly(κ)-time quantum algorithm AL, and T = poly(κ)
such that the following holds. Let X ← {0, 1} be a uniform random bit. Let |ψ⟩ be sampled
uniformly from the PRS ensemble if X = 0, and otherwise let |ψ⟩ be sampled from the Haar











Proof. We first describe A. For some T to be chosen later, on input |ψ⟩⊗T , A measures each
copy of |ψ⟩ in a different randomly chosen Clifford basis. Call the list of measurement bases
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bT ) and the measurement results c = (c1, c2, . . . , cT ). A then feeds (b, c) into
a single query to L, and outputs the result of the query. This takes polynomial time because
there exists an O(n3)-time algorithm to sample a random n-qubit Clifford unitary, and this
algorithm also produces an implementation of the unitary with O(n2/ logn) gates [20, 3].
The PP language L we choose for the oracle is most easily described in terms of a
PostBQP algorithm B(b, c) (i.e. a postselected polynomial-time quantum algorithm, as in
Definition 23), by the equivalence PostBQP = PP [1].5 Let S be a 117 -approximate n-qubit
quantum T -design (Definition 7) such that a state can be drawn from S in poly(κ) time
(because n, T ≤ poly(κ), the existence of such a design follows from Lemma 8). B begins by
initializing the state:









5 Note that any promise problem in PostBQP is also in PP [1], and any promise problem in PP can be
extended to a language in PP because PP is a syntactic class. Hence, we might as well take a language
in PP instead of a promise problem.
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B measures all but the leftmost qubit of ρ̂ in the basis given by b, and postselects on
observing c (i.e. B outputs ∗ if the measurements are not equal to c). Finally, conditioned
on postselection succeeding, B measures and outputs the result of the leftmost qubit that
was not measured.
It remains to show that A distinguishes the pseudorandom and Haar-random state
ensembles. For the purpose of this analysis, it will be convenient to view ρ̂ as an approximation
to the state:









where the ε-approximate T -design S is replaced by the Haar measure σ2n . Indeed, we will
essentially argue the algorithm’s correctness if the state ρ̂ is replaced by ρ, and then argue
that this implies the correctness of the actual algorithm.
For each k ∈ K, define Ok = |φk⟩ ⟨φk|. Note that if X = 0 (i.e. |ψ⟩ is pseudorandom),
there always exists a k such that Tr(Ok |ψ⟩ ⟨ψ|) = 1, namely whichever k satisfies |ψ⟩ = |φk⟩.
On the other hand, by Lemma 14 and a union bound, if X = 1 (i.e. |ψ⟩ is Haar-random),
Tr(Ok |ψ⟩ ⟨ψ|) < 13 for every k ∈ K, except with probability at most |K| · e
−2n/3 ≤ negl(κ)
over |ψ⟩.
If we choose M = |K|, ε = 13 , and δ = 0.001−|K|·e
−2n/3, then by Theorem 4 there exists a
quantum algorithm that takes as input the results (b, c) of T = O(log |K|) = O(κ) single-copy
random Clifford measurements, uses the measurement results to estimate Tr(Ok |ψ⟩ ⟨ψ|) for
each k up to additive error 13 , and is correct with probability at least 0.999 + |K| · e
−2n/3. In
particular, this algorithm can distinguish the pseudorandom ensemble from the Haar-random
ensemble, by checking if there exists a k such that the estimate for Tr(Ok |ψ⟩ ⟨ψ|) is at least
2
3 . Call this algorithm C, so that Pr[C(b, c) = X] ≥ 0.999.
We will not actually use C, but only its existence. By the optimality of the Bayes
decision rule [11, Chapter 4.4.1], because C uses (b, c) to identify a state |ψ⟩ as either Haar-
random or pseudorandom with probability 0.999, an algorithm that computes the maximum
a posteriori estimate of X also succeeds with probability at least 0.999. In symbols, let
pi = Pr[X = i | b, c], which we view as a random variable (depending on b and c) for each
i ∈ {0, 1}. Then Pr [arg maxi pi = X] ≥ 0.999.
Next, observe that Pr [arg maxi pi = X] = E [Pr [arg maxi pi = X|b, c]] = E [maxi pi], by
the law of total expectation. Hence, by Markov’s inequality (and the fact that 12 ≤ maxi pi ≤
1), we know that Pr
[
maxi pi ≥ 34
]
≥ 0.996. In other words, the Bayes decision rule is usually
confident in its predictions, so to speak.
Notice that pi equals the probability (conditioned on postselection succeeding) that B
outputs i if it starts with ρ in place of ρ̂. For i ∈ {0, 1}, define p̂i analogously as the postselcted
output probabilities of B itself: p̂i = Pr [B(b, c) = i | B(b, c) ∈ {0, 1}]. To argue that A is
correct with 0.995 probability, it suffices to show that Pr
[
maxi p̂i ≥ 23 ∧ arg maxi p̂i = X
]
≥
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Above, the first inequality follows from the assumption that S is a 117 -approximate T -design,
because the acceptance probability of a postselected quantum algorithm can be viewed as
the ratio of two probabilities:
p̂i =
Pr[B(b, c) = i]
Pr[B(b, c) ∈ {0, 1}] .
Fact 9 implies that both the numerator and denominator change by at most a multiplicative
factor of 1± 117 when switching between ρ and ρ̂. So, if pi ≥
3





= 23 . The
second inequality follows by a union bound, and the remaining inequalities were established
above. ◀
We remark that the above theorem also holds relative to all oracles, in the sense that
if the state generation algorithm G in the definition of the PRS (Definition 12) queries a
classical or quantum oracle U , then the corresponding ensemble of states can be distinguished
from Haar-random by a polynomial-time quantum algorithm with a PostBQPU oracle.
4 Pseudorandomness from a Quantum Oracle
In this section, we construct a quantum oracle (U ,P) relative to which BQP = QMA and
PRUs exist.
4.1 BQP = QMA Relative to (U , P)
We start with a lemma showing that the acceptance probability of a quantum query algorithm,
viewed as a function of the unitary transformation used in the query, is Lipschitz.





. Then f is 2T -Lipschitz in the Frobenius norm.
Proof. Suppose that ||U − V ||F ≤ d. By Lemma 6, this implies that the distance between U
and V in the diamond norm is at most 2d. The sub-additivity of the diamond norm under
composition implies that as superoperators, ||AU −AV ||⋄ ≤ 2Td. By the definition of the
diamond norm, it must be the case that |f(U)− f(V )| ≤ 2Td. ◀
The next lemma extends Lemma 16 to QMA verifiers: we should think of V as a QMA
verifier that receives a witness |ψ⟩, in which case this lemma states that the maximum
acceptance probability of V is Lipschitz with respect to the queried unitary.
▶ Lemma 17. Let VU (|ψ⟩) be quantum algorithm that makes T queries to U ∈ U(D) and
takes as input a quantum state |ψ⟩ on some fixed (but arbitrary) number of qubits. Define
f(U) = max|ψ⟩ Pr
[
VU (|ψ⟩) = 1
]
. Then f is 2T -Lipschitz in the Frobenius norm.




VU (|ψ⟩) = 1
]
,
so that f(U) = max|ψ⟩ fψ(U). Lemma 16 implies that fψ is 2T -Lipschitz for every |ψ⟩. Let
U, V ∈ U(D), and suppose that |ψ⟩ and |φ⟩ are such that f(U) = fψ(U) and f(V ) = fφ(V ).
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Then:
|f(U)− f(V )| = |fψ(U)− fφ(V )|
= max{fψ(U)− fφ(V ), fφ(V )− fψ(U)}
≤ max{fψ(U)− fψ(V ), fφ(V )− fφ(U)}
≤ 2T ||U − V ||F ,
where the third line uses the fact that fψ(V ) ≤ fφ(V ) and fφ(U) ≤ fψ(U), and the last line
uses the fact that fψ and fφ are 2T -Lipschitz. ◀
We are now ready to prove the first main result of this section, that BQPU,P = QMAU,P .
▶ Theorem 18. Let U = {Un}n∈N be a quantum oracle where each Un is chosen randomly
from µ2n2n . Let P be an arbitrary PSPACE-complete language. Then with probability 1 over U ,
BQPU,P = QMAU,P .
Proof. First, some notation. We view each Un alternatively as either a unitary transformation
on 2n qubits, or as a list of 2n different n-qubit unitary transformations Un = {Unm}m∈{0,1}n
indexed by n-bit strings.
Let L ∈ QMAU,P , which means that there exists a polynomial-time QMAU,P verifier
VU,P(x, |ψ⟩) with completeness 23 and soundness
1
3 . Without loss of generality, we can
amplify the completeness and soundness probabilities of V to 1112 and
1
12 , respectively. Let
p(n) be a polynomial upper bound on the running time of V on inputs of length n.
We now describe a BQPU,P machine AU,P(x) such that, with probability 1 over U , A





For each n ∈ [d], A performs process tomography on each Un, producing estimates Ũn such
that ||Ũn ·Ũ†n−Un ·U†n||⋄ ≤ 112p(|x|) for every n, with probability at least
2
3 over the randomness
of A.6 Let S be the algorithm from Lemma 8 that samples from a 112 -approximate unitary
p(|x|)-design on n qubits, given as input a random seed r ← {0, 1}kn where kn = poly(n, |x|).
Consider a QMAP verifier ṼP(x, |ψ⟩) that simulates VU,P(x, |ψ⟩) by replacing queries to
U as follows. For each n ∈ [d+ 1, p(|x|)], Ṽ samples a function fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}kn from
a 2p(|x|)-wise independent function family. Then, for n ∈ [d], queries to Un are replaced
by queries to Ũn. For n ∈ [d + 1, p(|x|)] and m ∈ {0, 1}n, queries to Unm are replaced by
queries to S(fn(m)) (i.e. the mth unitary in Un is replaced by an element of the p(|x|)-
design, selected by fn(m)). Consider the QMAP promise problem L̃ corresponding to Ṽ
with completeness 23 and soundness
1
3 . Since QMA
A ⊆ PSPACEA for all classical oracles A,
L̃ ∈ PSPACEP = PSPACE, so A can decide L̃(x) with a single query to P. A does this, and
outputs L̃(x).




≥ 23 . It
will be convenient to define several hybrid verifiers:
V1 = V.
V2: For each n ∈ [d + 1, p(|x|)], chooses a matrix Un ← µ2
n
2n . Simulates V1, replacing
queries to Un by Un for n ∈ [d+ 1, p(|x|)].
6 There are many ways to accomplish this. For instance, one can use the Choi-Jamiołkowski isomorphism
and quantum state tomography [23] to estimate the Choi state of Un to inverse polynomial (in 2n) error
in trace distance. The estimated unitary transformation Ũn can then be compiled to a circuit using
2O(n) 1- and 2-qubit gates [26]. Since n ≤ d = O(log |x|), this can be done in polynomial time.
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V3: For each n ∈ [d + 1, p(|x|)], samples a function gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}kn uniformly
at random. Simulates V2, replacing queries to Unm by by queries to S(gn(m)) for
n ∈ [d+ 1, p(|x|)] and m ∈ {0, 1}n.
V4: For each n ∈ [d + 1, p(|x|)], samples a function fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}kn from a
2p(|x|)-wise independent function family. Simulates V3, replacing queries to gn by fn.
V5: Simulates V4, replacing queries to Un by queries to Ũn for n ∈ [d]. Note that V5 and
Ṽ are equivalent, and that of these hybrids, V5 is the only one whose output depends on
the randomness of A (by way of Ũn).
For i ∈ [5] and a fixed choice of U , define:
acc(Vi) = max
|ψ⟩
Pr [Vi(x, |ψ⟩) = 1] ,
which is well defined by the extreme value theorem. We now bound |acc(Vi)− acc(Vi−1)| for
various i:
By Lemma 17, because V makes at most p(|x|) queries, we know that acc(V1), viewed as
a function of (Ud+1,Ud+2, . . . ,Up(|x|)), is 2p(|x|)-Lipschitz in the Frobenius norm. Hence,





















The factor of 2 appears because Theorem 11 applies to one-sided error, but the absolute
value forces us to consider two-sided error.
Fact 10 and the assumption that S samples from a 112 -approximate unitary p(|x|)-design
implies that for any fixed |ψ⟩, |Pr [V2(x, |ψ⟩) = 1]− Pr [V3(x, |ψ⟩) = 1]| ≤ 112 . This in
turn implies that |acc(V2)− acc(V3)| ≤ 112 .
Zhandry [28, Theorem 6.1] shows that a quantum algorithm that makes T queries to a
random function can be exactly simulated by the same algorithm with T queries to a
2T -wise independent function, so acc(V3) = acc(V4).
Because ||Ũn · Ũ†n−Un · U†n||⋄ ≤ 112p(|x|) for each n ∈ [d] with probability at least
2
3 over A,
from the definition of the diamond norm [5] and because V makes at most p(|x|) queries,
it holds that PrA
[
|acc(V4)− acc(V5)| ≥ 112
]
≤ 13 .
Putting these bounds together, we have that, except with probability 2e−|x| over U :
























This is to say that A correctly decides L(x), expect with probability at most 2e−|x| over U .
By the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, because
∑∞
i=1 2i · 2e−i =
4
e−2 <∞, A correctly decides L(x)
for all but finitely many x ∈ {0, 1}∗, with probability 1 over U . Hence, with probability 1
over U , A can be modified into an algorithm A′ that agrees with L on every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, by
simply hard-coding those x on which A and L disagree.
Because there are only countably many QMAU,P machines, we can union bound over all
L ∈ QMAU,P to conclude that QMAU,P ⊆ BQPU,P with probability 1 over U . ◀
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4.2 PRUs Relative to (U , P)
We proceed to the second part of the oracle construction, showing that PRUs exist relative to
(U ,P). We begin with a lemma establishing that the average advantage of a polynomial-time
adversary is small against our PRU construction. Here, we should think of {Uk}k∈[N ] as the
PRU ensemble.
▶ Lemma 19. Consider a quantum algorithm AO,U that makes T queries to O ∈ U(D) and
U = (U1, . . . , UN ) ∈ U(D)N . For fixed U , define:






















Proof. Our strategy is to reduce to the quantum query lower bound for unstructured search.
Intuitively, if A could identify whether O ∈ {U1, . . . , UN} or not, then A could be modified
into a quantum algorithm B that finds a single marked item from a list of size N . Then the





More formally, we construct an algorithm B(x) that queries a string x ∈ {0, 1}N as follows.
B draws a unitary V = (V0, V1, . . . , VN ) ∈ U(D)N+1 from µN+1D . Then, B runs A, replacing
queries to O by queries to V0, and replacing queries to Uk ∈ U by V0 if xk = 1 and by Vk if
xk = 0.








































Above, the first line applies linearity of expectation, the second line holds by definition of B,
and the third line holds for some universal c by the BBBV theorem [10]. ◀
The next lemma uses Lemma 19 to show that the advantage of A is small with extremely
high probability, which follows from the strong concentration properties of the Haar measure
(Theorem 11).
▶ Lemma 20. Consider a quantum algorithm AO,U that makes T queries to O ∈ U(D) and
U = (U1, . . . , UN ) ∈ U(D)N . Let adv(AU ) be defined as in Lemma 20. Then there exists a




[∣∣adv(AU )∣∣ ≥ p] ≤ 2 exp(− (D − 2) (p− cT 2/N)2384T 2
)
.
Proof. By Lemma 16, adv(AU ) is 4T -Lipschitz as a function of U , because adv(AU ) can be
expressed as the the difference between the acceptance probabilities of two algorithms that
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Similar reasoning yields the same upper bound on PrU←µN
D
[
adv(AU ) ≤ −p
]
, so we get the
final bound (with an additional factor of 2) by a union bound. ◀
Completing the security proof of the PRU construction amounts to combining Lemma 20
with a union bound over all possible polynomial-time adversaries.
▶ Theorem 21. Let U = {Un}n∈N be a quantum oracle where each Un is chosen randomly
from µ2n2n . Let P be an arbitrary PSPACE-complete language. Then with probability 1 over U ,
there exists a family of PRUs relative to (U ,P).
Proof. Fix an input length n ∈ N. We take the key set K = [2n] and take the PRU family to
be {Uk}k∈K, where Un = (U1, U2, . . . , U2n) ∈ U(2n)2
n . In words, the family consists of the
2n different Haar-random n-qubit unitaries specified by Un.
Without loss of generality, assume the adversary is a uniform polynomial-time quantum
algorithm AO,U,P(1n, x), where x ∈ {0, 1}poly(n) is the advice and O ∈ U(2n) is the oracle
that the adversary seeks to distinguish as pseudorandom or Haar-random.
By Lemma 20 with N = D = 2n and T = poly(n), for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1}poly(n),
AO,U,P(1n, x) achieves non-negligible advantage with extremely low probability over U . This














By a union bound over all x ∈ {0, 1}poly(n), AO,U,P(1n, x) achieves advantage larger







Hence, by the Borel-Cantelli lemma, A achieves negligible advantage for all but finitely many
input lengths n ∈ N with probability 1 over U , as
∑∞
n=1 negl(n) < ∞. This is to say that
{Uk}k∈K defines a PRU ensemble. ◀
We expect that using the techniques of Chung, Guo, Liu, and Qian [16], one can extend
Theorem 21 to a security proof against adversaries with quantum advice. Some version of
[16, Theorem 5.14] likely suffices. The idea is that breaking the PRU should remain hard
even if A could query an explicit description of O and explicit descriptions of Uk for k ∈ [2n],
which is a strictly more powerful model. But then this corresponds to the security game
defined in [16, Definition 5.12], except that the range of the random oracle is U(D) rather
than the finite set [M ].
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A Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let {λi : i ∈ [N ]} denote the eigenvalues of UV †. Then we have:
||U − V ||2F = Tr
(
(U − V )(U − V )†
)












where Re(λi) denotes the real part of λi. The last line holds because the eigenvalues
of a unitary matrix have absolute value 1. Aharonov, Kitaev, and Nisan [5] show that
||U · U† − V · V †||⋄ = 2
√
1− d2, where d is the distance in the complex plane between 0 and
the polygon whose vertices are λ1, . . . , λN . From this we may conclude:










≤ 2||U − V ||F ,
where the first inequality uses the fact that either all of the eigenvalues have positive real
components and therefore d ≥ mini Re(λi), or else d ≥ 0; the second inequality substitutes
1−max{x, 0}2 ≤ 2−2x which holds for all x ∈ R; and the third inequality substitutes (1). ◀
B Complexity Classes
▶ Definition 22. A promise problem L = (Lyes,Lno) is in QMA if there exists a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm V(x, |ψ⟩) called a QMA verifier and a polynomial p such that:
1. (Completeness) If x ∈ Lyes, then there exists a state |ψ⟩ (called a witness or proof) on
p(|x|) qubits such that Pr [V(x, |ψ⟩) = 1] ≥ 23 .
2. (Soundness) If x ∈ Lno, then for every state |ψ⟩ on p(|x|) qubits, Pr [V(x, |ψ⟩) = 1] ≤ 13 .
Aaronson [1] defined PostBQP as follows, and showed that PostBQP = PP.
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▶ Definition 23. A promise problem L = (Lyes,Lno) is in PostBQP if there exists a
polynomial-time quantum algorithm A(x) that outputs a trit {0, 1, ∗} such that:
1. If x ∈ Lyes ∪ Lno, then Pr [A(x) ∈ {0, 1}] > 0. When A(x) ∈ {0, 1}, we say that
postselection succeeds.
2. If x ∈ Lyes, then Pr [A(x) = 1 | A(x) ∈ {0, 1}] ≥ 23 . In other words, conditioned on
postselection succeeding, A outputs 1 with at least 23 probability.
3. If x ∈ Lno, then Pr [A(x) = 1 | A(x) ∈ {0, 1}] ≤ 13 . In other words, conditioned on
postselection succeeding, A outputs 1 with at most 13 probability.
Technically, the definition of PostBQP is sensitive to the choice of universal gate set
used to specify quantum algorithms, as was observed by Kuperberg [21]. However, for most
“reasonable” gate sets, such as unitary gates with algebraic entries [21], the choice of gate set
is irrelevant. We assume such a gate set, e.g. {CNOT, H, T}.
We consider versions of BQP, QMA, and PostBQP augmented with quantum oracles,
where the algorithm (or in the case of QMA, the verifier) can apply unitary transformations
from an infinite sequence U = {Un}n∈N. We denote the respective complexity classes by
BQPU , QMAU , and PostBQPU . We assume the algorithm incurs a cost of n to query Un so
that a polynomial-time algorithm on input x can query Un for any n ≤ poly(|x|). In this
model, a query to Un consists of a single application of either Un, U†n, or controlled versions
of Un or U†n.
The quantum oracle model includes classical oracles as a special case. For a language
L, a query to L is implemented via the unitary transformation U that acts as U |x⟩ |b⟩ =
|x⟩ |b⊕ L(x)⟩.
C PRSs with Binary Phases
In this section, we sketch a proof that a PRS construction proposed by Ji, Liu, and Song [19]
and shown secure by Brakerski and Shmueli [13] can be broken efficiently with an NP oracle.
The PRS family is based on pseudorandom functions (PRFs). Let {fk}k∈K be a PRF family
of functions fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} keyed by K. The corresponding PRS family is the set of







For simplicity, suppose that each fk is balanced, meaning that |f−1k (0)| = |f
−1
k (1)| = 2n−1.
Consider the quantum circuit below:
|0⟩ H •
|ψ⟩ / × H⊗n H⊗n
|0⊗n⟩ / H⊗n ×
Observe that if |ψ⟩ = |φk⟩, then this circuit produces the state |0⟩ |φk⟩|+⟩
⊗n+|+⟩⊗n|φk⟩√
2 from
a single copy of |φk⟩. Notice that if we measure the resulting state in the computational
basis, then we observe |0⟩ |x⟩ |y⟩ with nonzero probability for x, y ∈ {0, 1}n if and only if
fk(x) = fk(y). This is because the amplitude on this basis state is given by:
⟨x| ⟨y| |φk⟩ |+⟩









2:20 Quantum Pseudorandomness and Classical Complexity
Furthermore, this shows that we in fact sample a uniformly random pair (x, y) such that
fk(x) = fk(y).
Suppose that given a state |ψ⟩ which is either pseudorandom or Haar-random, we repeat
this procedure poly(n) times to obtain a list of pairs {(xi, yi)}. It is an NP problem to decide
whether there exists a k such that fk(xi) = fk(yi) for all i. If |ψ⟩ = |φk⟩ for some k then
this NP language always returns true, while if |ψ⟩ is Haar-random, this NP language returns
true with negligible probability, so long as we take sufficiently many samples (xi, yi).
In the case where fk is not perfectly balanced, we simply observe that the above procedure
still works with good probability so long as fk is close to a balanced function. But PRFs must
be close to balanced functions, in the sense that for most k ∈ K, it must be possible to change
a negl(n) fraction of the outputs of fk to turn it into a balanced function. Otherwise, the
PRF family could be distinguished efficiently from random functions, which are negl(n)-close
to balanced with high probability.
